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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE -THE SO-CALLED
DISTRACTION RULE
The defendant contracted with the plaintiffs to build an addition to
the plaintiffs' home. The defendant's workmen used sheetrock to block
an archway connecting the addition to the home to protect the plaintiffs'
children. During a rain storm, the plaintiff-wife was injured when she
attempted to move the sheetrock in order to close the windows in the
construction area. Held, the evidence before the trial court was insufficient
to establish defendant's negligence but was sufficient to establish plaintiff-
wife's contributory negligence; moreover, the facts did not warrant an
instruction to the jury on the so-called distraction rule. Bashaw v. Dyke,
122 So.2d 507 (Fla. App. 1960).
As a general proposition, when a person knows or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known of a particular danger, and fails to avoid
the danger, he is held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law.'
However, if the person's attention is distracted from the danger by a
sufficient cause, the question of contributory negligence is one for jury
determination.2
In various jurisdictions the question of what is a sufficient cause to
divert or distract a person's attention from a known or obvious danger
has been interpreted differently. The distraction rule has been applied
primarily to cases wherein business invitees, 3 pedestrians, 4 or motorists5 were
1. See, e.g., Meng v. Penner, 179 Kan. 789, 298 P.2d 246 (1956); see also
25 Am. JUR. Highways §§ 462, 466 (1940); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 120 (1950).
2. See 25 AM. JUR. Highways § 468 (1940); 40 C.J.S. Highways § 270 (1944);
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.5, at 910 (1956).
3. Cheney v. S. Kann Sons & Co., 37 F. Supp. 493 (D.D.C. 1941); Laird v.
T. W. Mather, Inc., 51 Cal. 2d 210, 331 P.2d 617 (1958); I-lodge v. Weinstock,
Lubin & Co., 109 Cal. App. 393, 293 Pac. 80 (1930); Miller v. Bart, 90 Ga. App. 755,
84 S.E.2d 127 (1954); Warner v. Hansen, 102 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1960); Knight v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 32 So.2d 508 (La. 1947); Wear v. Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334 (1872);
Boyle v. Preketes, 262 Mich. 629, 247 N.W. 763 (1933); Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 223 Minn. 1, 26 N.W.2d 355 (1947); McDonald v. Heinemann, 141 S.W.2d
177 (Mo. App. 1940); Tehan v. Freed, 261 App. Div. 969, 25 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1941);
Hallbauer v. Zarfoss, 191 Pa. Super. 171, 156 A.2d 542 (1959); Rogers v. Max Azen,
Inc., 340 Pa. 328, 16 A.2d 529 (1940); Zebren v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 105
N.W.2d 563 (Wis. 1960).
4. City of Birmingham v. Monette, 241 Ala. 109, 1 So.2d 1 (1941); Racine
Tire Co. v. Grady, 205 Ala. 423, 88 So. 337 (1921); Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co.,
4 Cal. 2d 511, 50 P.2d 801 (1935); City & County of Denver v. Maurer, 47 Colo.
209, 106 Pac. 875 (1910); Deane v. Johnston, 104 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1958); Clover
v. City Council, 83 Ga. App. 314, 63 S.E.2d 422 (1951); Bender v. Incorporated Town of
Minden, 124 Iowa 685, 100 N.W. 352 (1904); Mathews v. Cedar Rapids, 80 Iowa 459,
45 N.W. 894 (1890); Merchants' Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Bargholt, 129 Ky. 60,
110 S.W. 364 (1908); City of Maysville v. Guilfoyle; 110 Ky. 670, 62 S.W. 493
(1901); Le Beau v. Telephone & Tel. Constr. Co., 109 Mich. 302, 67 N.W. 339
(1896): Goldman v. City of Columbia, 211 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1948); Cates v. Evans,
142 S.,V.2d 654 (Mo. 1940); Jackson v. City of Jamestown, 33 N.D. 596, 157
N.W. 475 (1916); Strack v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 91, 98 N.W. 947 (1904);
Crites v. City of New Richmond, 98 Wis. 55, 73 N.W. 322 (1897).
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injured. The degree of attention required of the plaintiff will depend on the
circumstances; the greater the possible danger, the greater the attention
required.6 For example, a business invitee is not required to exercise as
high a degree of attention as a pedestrian; nor must a pedestrian exercise
as much attention while walking as a motorist while driving.7
In some circumstances a mere subjective distraction has been held
sufficient, while in others an external diversion has been required. Since
a motorist is required to exercise a high degree of attention, the courts
have required that the distraction be an external force that threatens danger.,
In Dreyer v. Otter Tail Power Co.," the court succinctly stated the law of
distraction in motorist cases when it said:
Ordinarily distracting circumstances will be found to consist of an
object moving or movable [children or other vehicles] which in
and of itself threatens or reasonably may be thought to threaten
danger.10
However, some courts have permitted the question of a pedestrian's or
business invitee's contributory negligence to go to the jury when the
distracting cause was plaintiff's concentration on some absorbing thought or
conversation. 1 In West Ky. Tel. Co. v. Pharis,12 the plaintiff knew of
5. Call v. City of Burley, 57 Iowa 58, 62 P.2d 101 (1936); Dreyer v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 205 Minn. 286, 285 N.W. 707 (1939); Dasnau v. Oswego, 204 App.
Div. 189, 198 N.Y. Supp. 226 (1923); Schawe v. Levendecker, 269 S.W. 864 (Tex., Civ.
App. 1925); City of Radford v. Calhoun, 165 Va. 24 181 S.E. 345 (1935).
6. See, e.g., City of Knoxville v. Cain, 128 Tenn. 250, 159 S.W. 1084 (1913);
see also 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 120 (1950).
7. Rogers v. Max Azen, Inc., 340 Pa. 328, 16 A.2d 529 (1940); Hallbauer v.
Zarfoss, 191 Pa. Super. 171, 156 A.2d 542 (1959).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. 205 Minn. 286, 285 N.XV. 707 (1939).
10. Dreyer v. Otter Tail Power Co., 205 Minn. 286, 290, 285 N.W. 707, 709 (1939).
11. Miller v. Bart, 90 Ga. App. 755, 84 S.E.2d 127 (1954) (business invitee was
sufficiently distracted by conversation); City of Maysville v. Guilfoyle, 110 Ky. 670,
62 S.W. 493 (1901) (pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by thoughts of her brother-
in-law's sick child); West Ky. Tel. Co. v. Pharis, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1838, 78 S.W. 917
(Ct. App. 1904) (pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by thoughts of her sick sister);
Weare v. Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334 (1872) (pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by
thoughts of her children who were in danger); Le Beau v. Telephone & Tel. Constr. Co.,
109 Mich. 302, 67 N.W. 339 (1896) (pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by
construction workers); Strack v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 91, 98 N.W. 947 (1904)(pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by thoughts of her sick friend); Cumisky v.
City of Kenosha, 87 \Vis. 286, 58 N.W. 395 (1894) (timid pedestrian was sufficiently
distracted by workmen whom she was attempting to avoid); Wheeler v. Town of
Westport, 30 Wis. 392 (1872) (pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by conversation);
Merchants' Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Bargholt, 129 Ky. 60, 75, 110 S.W. 364, 369(1908). In this case the pedestrian was sufficiently distracted by a building in the process
of construction. The court stated: "We are aware that in some jurisdictions a contrary
rule is held, notably Pennsylvania, and a distinction is there made between subjective
cases and cases external or objective, but no such distinction is made in this State,
and the same rule applies whether the distracting cause is some external object or the
concentration of the plaintiff's mind and thought upon some absorbing topic or
question." Contra, Racine Tire Co. v. Grady, 205 Ala. 423, 88 So. 337 (1921)(pedestrian was not sufficiently distracted by thoughts of money matters); Bender v.
Incorporated Town of Minden, 124 Iowa 685. 100 N.W. 352 (1904) (pedestrian was
not sufficiently distracted by conversation); Jackson v. City of Jamestown, 33 N.D. 596,
157 N.W. 475 (1916) (pedestrian was not sufficiently distracted by conversation);
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a telephone wire on the sidewalk, but momentarily forgot it because her
mind was distracted by the sickness of a member of her family. The
court held that the distraction was a circumstance which authorized
submission of the case to the jury. However, in Racine Tire Co. v. Grady,13
the plaintiff relied on the fact that he was thinking of money matters
while going to the bank as an excuse for his forgetfulness; the court
refused to submit the question of plaintiff's negligence to the jury.
The "external diversion" cases involving business invitees have focused
usually upon engrossing advertisements. An attractive display of merchandise
has been held sufficient to distract a customer's attention from a known
or obvious danger. A storekeeper intends to attract his customer's attention
to his merchandise displays. Therefore, a proprietor should not be heard
to complain of contributory negligence when a customer injured on the
premises looked at "eye-catching" displays instead of where he was going,
and thus failed to see what would otherwise be an obvious danger.' 4 The
Pennsylvania courts speak of attractive displays of merchandise as "attention
arresters," and there are an increasing number of cases that give credence
to this form of distraction.", It has been held that even a menu which
was conspicuously displayed above a lunch counter could be a sufficient
distraction.' 6 However, in Subasky v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.'
the court refused to permit the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence
to go to the jury when the distraction was no more than an ordinary display
of oranges and grapefruit.
The attempted application of the so-called distraction rule in the instant
City of Birmingham v. Monette, 241 Ala. 109, 113, 1 So.2d 1, 4 (1941). In this case
the pedestrian was not sufficiently distracted by thoughts of getting to her car. The
court said: "Her inattention or concentration upon some other thought is not sufficient,
unless stimulated by some exterior immediate circumstance tending to distract her
attention."
12. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1838, 78 S.\W. 917 (Ct. App. 1904).
13. 205 Ala. 423, 425, 88 So. 337, 338 (1921): "[1f absorption of thought upon
money matters were to be recognized as an excuse for forgetfulness, then certainly no
adult male person with a family to support in these strenuous times could ever be
charged with negligence as a matter of law .... ." For a similar view, see Goldman v.City of Columbia, 211 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Mo. 1948): "To excuse forgetfulness of,
or inattention to a known danger, some fact, condition, or circumstance must exist which
would divert the mind or attention of an ordinary prudent person, and mere lapse of
memory is not sufficient."
14. Warner v. Hansen, 102 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1960); Hallbauer v. Zarfoss,
191 Pa. Super. 171, 156 A.2d 542 (1959).
15. Rogers v. Max Azen, Inc., 340 Pa. 328, 16 A.2d 529 (1940); Hallbauer v.
Zarfoss, 191 Pa. Super. 171, 156 A.2d 542 (1959); Cheney v. S. Kann Sons & Co.,
37 F. Supp. 493 (D.D.C. 1941); Laird v. T. W. Mather, Inc., 51 Cal. 2d 210, 331
P.2d 617 (1958); Hodge v. Weinstock, Lubin & Co., 109 Cal. App. 393, 293Pac. 80 (1930); Clover v. City Council, 83 Ga. App. 314, 63 S.E.2d 422 (1951);
Warner v. Hansen, 102 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1960). Contra, Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co.,
4 Cal. 2d 511, 50 P.2d 801 (1935); Knight v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 So.2d 508(La. 1947); Boyle v. Preketes, 262 Mich. 629, 247 N.W. 763 (1933); Cates v. Evans,142 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. 1940); Tehan v. Freed, 261 App. Div. 969, 25 N.Y.S.2d 882
(1941).
16. Johnson v. Rulon, 363 Pa. 585, 70 A.2d 325 (1950).
17. 161 Pa. Super. 90, 53 A.2d 840 (1947); see Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
223 Minn. 1, 26 N.W.2d 355 (1947).
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case 18 was factually unique,19 as the injury was not to a pedestrian, business
invitee, or motorist, but to a plaintiff in her home. The trial court had
instructed the jury as follows:
If you believe that Mrs. Dyke . . should have had knowledge
of the condition which created the peril, you may still find [her
free from contributory negligence if you believe that her attention
was diverted or distracted away from the sheetrock ...by a cause
sufficient to distract or divert an ordinarily prudent woman under
the same circumstances .... 20
The First District Court of Appeal found that the diversion allegedly caused
"by the rain blowing into [plaintiffs'] home through the open windows of
the den, and by a sense of urgency to close the windows against the
elements" '21 was insufficient to warrant an instruction on the so-called
distraction rule.
Deane v. Johnston22 was cited as "apparently the only Florida case
in which the distraction rule has been applied .... -23 The plaintiff, in
attempting to get to her employer's car, and home as quickly as possible
to avoid an approaching hurricane, tripped over a scale on the sidewalk.
The traffic light in her path diverted her attention from the scale. The
Florida Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient distraction to permit
the jury to decide the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Throughout the principal case the court treated distracting circumstances
as creating "an exception to the general rules governing negligence, '24 rather
than as a mere element to be considered in determining contributory
negligence.
Although other jurisdictions have applied the distraction rule when the
diversion was less than in the instant case, even when merely subjective, it is
believed that the court was correct in requiring a stronger distraction.
However, it would seem that to treat distracting circumstances as a "so-called
rule," however hesitantly, serves only to confuse the already complicated
jurisprudence of negligence. It would appear preferable to treat distracting
circumstances as merely another element to be considered in determining
whether the plaintiff acted as a reasonable prudent person under the
circumstances.
HARRY M. ROSEN
18. Bashaw v. Dyke, 122 So.2d 507 (Fla. App. 1960).
19. For other unique factual situations in which the so.called distraction rule was
applied, see Flattery v. Goode, 38 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 1949); Dennis v. City of
Albemarle, 242 N.C. 263, 87 S.E.2d 561, on rehearing 243 N.C. 221, 90 S.E.2d 532
(1955); Burmek v. Miller Brewing Co., 107 NAV.2d 583 (Wis. 1961).
20. Bashaw v. Dyke, 122 So.2d 507, 510 (Fla. App. 1960).
21. Id. at 511.
22. 104 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1958).
23. Bashaw v. Dyke, 122 So.2d 507, 511 (Fla. App. 1960); compare Brandt v.
Van Zandt, 77 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1955). The court refused to apply the distraction rule
and seemed to indicate stricter requirements for the application of the rule. See also
Sinitz v. Shapiro, 100 So.2d 458 (Fla. App. 1958).
24. Bashaw v. Dyke, supra note 23, at 511.
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